Multi-domain comparison of safety standards by Baufreton, Philippe et al.
HAL Id: hal-02264379
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02264379
Submitted on 7 Aug 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Multi-domain comparison of safety standards
Philippe Baufreton, Jean-Paul Blanquart, J. Boulanger, H Delseny, J. Derrien,
J. Gassino, G Ladier, E Ledinot, M Leeman, P Quéré, et al.
To cite this version:
Philippe Baufreton, Jean-Paul Blanquart, J. Boulanger, H Delseny, J. Derrien, et al.. Multi-domain
comparison of safety standards. ERTS2 2010, Embedded Real Time Software & Systems, May 2010,
Toulouse, France. ￿hal-02264379￿
 Page 1/10 
Multi-domain comparison of safety standards 
P. Baufreton1, JP. Blanquart2, JL. Boulanger3, H. Delseny4, JC. Derrien1, 
J. Gassino5, G. Ladier4, E. Ledinot6, M. Leeman7, P. Quéré8, B. Ricque1 
1: Sagem Défense Sécurité, 180 Avenue de Paris, 91300 Massy, France 
2: Astrium Satellites, 31 rue des cosmonautes, 31402 Toulouse Cedex 04, France 
3: CERTIFER, 1 place de Boussu, 59416 Anzin, France 
4: Airbus, 316 route de Bayonne, 31060 Toulouse Cedex 09, France 
5: Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), BP 17, 92262 Fontenay-Aux-Roses, France 
6: Dassault Aviation, 78 quai Marcel Dassault, 92552 Saint-Cloud Cedex, France 
7: Valeo, 2 Avenue Fernand Pouillon, 94042 Créteil, France 
8: Renault, 1 avenue du Golf, 78288 Guyancourt, France 
 
Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of safety 
standards and their implementation in certification 
strategies from different domains such as 
aeronautics, automation, automotive, nuclear, 
railway and space. This work, performed in the 
context of the CG2E (“Club des Grandes Entreprises 
de l’Embarqué”), aims at identifying the main 
similarities and dissimilarities, for potential cross-
domain harmonization. We strive to find the most 
comprehensive ‘trans-sectorial’ approach, within a 
large number of industrial domains. Exhibiting the 
‘true goals’ of their numerous applicable standards, 
related to the safety of system and software, is a first 
important step towards harmonization, sharing 
common approaches, methods and tools whenever 
possible. 
Keywords: standards, safety, cross-domain 
comparison, software, certification 
1. Introduction, Objectives 
CG2E (“Club des Grandes Entreprises de 
l’Embarqué”) is an initiative launched (mid 2007) by 
major industrial companies involved in the 
development of critical embedded systems in a wide 
spectrum of application domains. Today this 
organization comprises more than twenty large, 
medium and small innovative companies, covering 
six important industrial fields that will be referred to 
in this paper. 
Several technical working groups have been 
launched in 2008, one of them addressing 
“standards & norms”, mainly related to the safety of 
critical embedded systems and software. After a 
wide state of the art survey performed in 2009, 
comparing the various standards and practices in 
many different industrial fields, several areas were 
identified including “dependability and certification”, 
the object of this paper. 
The CG2E objectives are the leverage of the 
domain-specific best practices in the development of 
software intensive safety critical embedded systems. 
It elaborates proposals, recommendations, 
roadmaps etc. based on collaborative work and 
discussions in dedicated thematic working groups. 
A team of about 20 experts and contributors to this 
activity has been working for one year. They have 
the opportunity to share their expertise within a 
transversal approach between the companies 
involved in this working group. 
Our meeting discussions led us to initiate the 
elaboration of a common terminology to address all 
these topics. 
Dedicated seminars helped us perform deep 
analyses of the main system and software 
standards, used in 6 industrial domains (civil 
aviation, automotive, space, automation and 
industrial control, nuclear plants, railway). 
This constitutes the basis for a comparative analysis 
and synthesis of the relevant standards for these 
major industrial domains, taking care of both 
technological and economical factors, without losing 
the main focus on safety. 
This paper presents a summary of the main topics 
that are addressed in more details in a deliverable of 
our working group, currently under preparation. 
2. History and positioning of standards 
This section presents a brief overview of the history 
and positioning of the analysed standards. We first 
present the generic multi-domain IEC 61508 
standard and the more specific standards derived 
from it, applicable mainly in automation, railway and 
automotive domains. Then we present the situation 
in three other domains which for various reasons use 
standards not directly related to the IEC 61508: 
nuclear, aeronautics and space. 
2.1. IEC 61508, automation, rail, automotive 
In September 1985, the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) set up a Task 
Group to assess the viability of developing a generic 
standard for Programmable Electronic Systems 
 Page 2/10 
(PESs). The outcome of which was the setting up of 
a working group to develop a system-based 
approach. A working group has previously been set 
up to deal with safety-related software. Both working 
groups collaborated on the development on an 
international standard that was to become IEC 
61508. 
The original scope of PESs was extended to include 
all types of electro-technical based technologies 
(electrical, electronic and programmable electronic 
systems (E/E/PE). Parts 1-7 of IEC 61508 were 
published during the period 1998-2000. In 2005 IEC 
Technical Report 61508-0 was published. A review 
process initiated in 2002 to update and improve the 
standard will be completed with the publication of 
IEC 61508 Edition 2 targeted by March / April 2010. 
The standard came up to meet the demand for 
moving from a prescriptive approach to a 
performance-based approach. The intention of the 
workgroup was to produce a base standard, i.e. 
according to IEC rules a standard to be used only to 
write other standards. However, the reality today is 
that IEC 61508 is directly used by industries. Sector 
specific standards have been derived from IEC 
61508, the closest one being IEC 61511 for process 
industries as most of the IEC61508 workgroup were 
coming from this sector. This resulted also in 
standard application conflicts between industry 
sectors having already operational standards with a 
holistic approach to systems. This is mainly the case 
with aeronautics. The paternity of IEC61508 over 
some standards is subject to controversy as some 
“sector-specific” standards (e.g. IEC61513 nuclear 
sector) were issued earlier and developed a very 
different safety approach. 
Concerning the automotive domain, in the 90’s, 
because of the increasing number and complexity of 
the safety critical systems embedded in a car, it has 
been felt that a common reference to define the state 
of the art was needed in order to avoid liability 
issues. Some carmakers and suppliers started to 
use the IEC 61508. Although the IEC 61508 
framework is considered very useful, many 
difficulties were experienced using this standard 
coming from process automation industry. Therefore, 
it was quickly felt in the community that a strongly 
adapted variant of IEC61508 was needed.  
Approved NWI (New Work Item) was registered in 
July 2007 starting the 4-year ISO 26262 project. Ten 
nations (Japan, USA, Germany, France, Italy, UK, 
Canada, Sweden, Austria and Belgium) are 
represented in the working group in charge of 
development of this standard and most industry key 
players participate. Nations no yet involved (India, 
China, Korea, Russia) will also apply this standard 
since they are willing to sell cars in European, USA 
or Japanese markets. We are confident that this 
standard will be applied on a worldwide scale.  
The project is currently in Draft International 
Standard (DIS) status. 
Standards derived IEC61508 include standards for 
process industries, machinery (IEC 61511:2003, 
62061:2005), power drive systems, programmable 
controllers (IEC 61800:1997, 61131-6(CDV)), 
communication networks (61784-3:2007), explosive 
atmospheres, detection, measurement, apparatus 
(EN 60079, 50271, 5042), medical devices (IEC 
60601:2005), railway (EN 50126, 50128, 50129) and 
automotive (ISO/DIS 26262). 
2.2. Nuclear domain 
The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) was 
created in 1957 within the United Nations to promote 
and support the safe use of nuclear technology for 
peaceful applications, and has currently 151 Member 
States.  
In particular, its Safety Guide [IAEA NS-G-1.3] 
provides general guidance on “Instrumentation and 
Control (I&C) Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear 
Power Plants”. This guide addresses the 
classification, safety requirements, and design of 
these systems. 
[IAEA NS-G-1.3] was published in 2002; it combines 
and revises earlier guides published in 1980 (50-SG-
D3: Protection System and related features) and 
1984 (50-SG-D8: Safety-Related Instrumentation 
and Control Systems).  
This chronology shows that the Protection System 
was regarded as the most important one and was 
addressed first in 1980, followed by the other 
systems important to safety in 1984. The revision 
and combination of these guides into NS-G-1.3 was 
motivated in particular by the need to take into 
account the evolution in computer-based systems 
and to include guidance on the classification of 
systems.  
According to an agreement with IAEA, the Technical 
Committee 45 of IEC (International Electrotechnical 
Commission) developed standards to implement 
IAEA safety principles in technical details. 
The approach of the following IEC-TC45 standards 
to design and verify computer-based systems has 
been tailored since the 1980’s to meet the needs of 
the nuclear plants: 
IEC 61226 establishes a method of classification of 
the I&C (instrumentation and control) functions for 
nuclear power plants.  
IEC 61513 provides general guidance for I&C 
systems used to perform functions important to 
safety, taking into account their classification. 
IEC 60880 provides requirements for the software of 
the highest class I&C systems of nuclear power 
plants, to achieve highly reliable software.  
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IEC 60880 is the earliest of the IEC-TC45 standards 
addressing software-based systems: it was edited in 
1986 (and revised in 2006) as a formalization of the 
experience gained during the development of the 
first computer-based Protection systems. In France, 
such digital protection systems were developed in 
the early 1980s’. 
Again, this shows that the most critical problem, i.e. 
how to develop class 1 software has been 
addressed first, and the need to cover the overall 
architecture progressively emerged when more and 
more functions moved from hard-wired logic to 
interconnected computer-based systems. 
2.3. Aeronautics domain 
In 1980, the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics, now RTCA Inc., established a 
committee for the development and documentation 
of software practices that would support the 
development of software-based airborne systems 
and equipment. The European Organisation for Civil 
Aviation Electronics, now the European Organisation 
for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE), had 
previously established a working group to produce a 
similar document and, in October 1980, was ready to 
publish document ED-35, "Recommendations on 
Software Practice and Documentation for Airborne 
Systems.". EUROCAE decided to stop editing its 
own document and instead to join RTCA to develop 
a common set of guidelines.  The joint document 
named ED-12/DO-178 "Software Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification" was 
published in 1982, followed by a revision A in 1985 
and a revision B in 1992. 
During the development of revision B, it became 
apparent that system-level information would be 
required as input to the software development 
process. Since many system-level decisions are 
fundamental to the safety and functional aspects of 
aircraft systems, regulatory involvement in the 
processes and results relating to such decisions is 
both necessary and appropriate. 
ED-79/ARP-4754 “Certification Considerations for 
Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems” was 
then published in 1995 by SAE (Society of 
Automotive Engineers) and EUROCAE for that 
purpose. It addresses the total life cycle of systems 
that implement aircraft level functions. It excludes 
specific coverage of the different systems, software 
and hardware design processes, beyond the issues 
of significance in establishing the safety of the 
implemented system.  
Specific coverage of complex hardware design 
aspects are dealt with in EUROCAE/RTCA 
document ED-80/DO-254 “Design Assurance 
Guidance for Airborne Electronic hardware” 
published in April 2000. 
Methodologies for safety assessment processes are 
detailed and illustrated in SAE document ARP4761. 
A revision A to ED-79/ARP-4754 is scheduled to be 
issued in 2010 and a revision C to ED-12/DO-178 
will be published in 2011 including technology-
specific or method-specific guidance and guidelines. 
2.4. Space domain 
The history of regulation in the space domain dates 
back to the very early days of the domain itself with 
the creation in 1958 by the United Nations of the 
COPUOS, Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. This committee has elaborated a series of 
treaties and principles, establishing in particular the 
responsibility of countries for the potential damages 
caused by launches from their territory. As a result 
most countries willing to proceed to space launches 
have established a set of rules and a legal 
authorisation scheme applicable to space launch 
activities. 
In addition to this legal regulation regime, the space 
industry has recognised the value of and need for 
standards to establish and implement space 
products and programmes. For instance in Europe, 
after the progressive elaboration of the ESA 
standardisation system PSS (Procedures, 
Specifications and Standards), ESA with the 
European space agencies and industries established 
in the early nineties the ECSS, European 
Cooperation for Space Standardisation, a 
cooperative effort for the purpose of developing and 
maintaining a single, coherent, recognised and 
accepted system of common standards. Important 
updates have been performed from mid 00’s with the 
so-called “-C issues”. 
The application of the ECSS standards is not 
enforced by law. The standards are proposed to be 
adopted, possibly with adaptations, by contract on a 
case by case basis. This scheme is facilitated by the 
fact that they are elaborated through cooperative 
work involving all stakeholders. 
ECSS series is organised as three major branches 
(M: Space project management; Q: Space product 
assurance; E: Space engineering) under a global 
heading (ST: System description, glossary). 
Each branch consists in a first level of standards, 
possibly complemented by additional documents 
(more detailed standards or guidance to apply the 
first level standard, or handbooks providing 
additional not-normative information). 
3. Regulation regimes and certification 
3.1. Certification 
To compare the various industrial domains with 
respect to the notion of certification, we first propose 
a domain independent definition, and then consider 
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how the various domain specific safety 
demonstration processes fit the generic definition.  
Certification aims at verifying that the industrial 
actors that deliver safety-sensitive products or 
services in a domain (e.g. energy or transport), 
actually deliver safe products or services. 
Certification involves an applicant, a regulation, an 
Authority, and an assessment body that has to be 
independent, or partially independent, of the 
applicant. 
In many cases the regulations were established by 
international organizations grouping member states 
that agreed on establishing shared rules to prevent 
shared risks e.g. ICAO in civil aviation, AEIA in 
nuclear industry, United Nations in space industry.  
In some cases, regulation came into force at national 
level, and then at international level to solve cross-
border interoperability issues. This is especially the 
case in the railway industry where the European 
member states are presently carrying out a 
regulation harmonization process, in particular 
through reciprocal acceptance of their national 
certificates. 
There are cases where the Authority and the 
assessment body are identical (e.g., FAA and EASA 
in civil aviation), and cases where an Authority 
granting certificates exists but there is no 
assessment body distinct from the applicant (e.g., 
automation and space industries). 
Preventing conflict of interest between applicant and 
assessment body is a key aspect of nuclear (IRSN), 
railway (ERA, EPSF, STRM-TG), and aeronautics 
(EASA-FAA) certification. 
In no industrial domain does certification lead to 
responsibility transfer from applicant to Authority. In 
case of severe accident, the involved manufacturer 
or service provider is the only entity liable for 
prosecution.  
The international or national regulations are high-
level texts stating very high level safety objectives. 
They are not to be confused with the safety 
standards discussed in this paper that are 
conformance means negotiated between industry 
and Authority to substantiate that the engineering 
process of the applicant meets these high level 
regulatory objectives. 
A noticeable exception is automotive industry which 
has no Authority, nor international functional safety 
regulation to conform to. However, it has to conform 
to regulation on specific technical domains (e.g., 
braking, steering …) to receive the required 
clearances to market a car. 
Typical certification of a product (e.g., in aeronautics) 
involves: 
(a) the process of assessing the design of a product 
to ensure that it complies with a set of standards 
applicable to that type of product so as to 
demonstrate an acceptable level of safety; 
(b) the process of assessing an individual product to 
ensure that it conforms with the certified type design; 
(c) the issuance of a certificate required by national 
laws to declare that a) or b) compliance with the 
standards is met. 
3.2. Qualification 
A qualification is defined for a specific task in a 
specific project. It is a set of activities to grant a 
confidence level to an entity, be it an organisation, a 
person or a tool. For instance, qualification is used to 
assure that a software life cycle process automated 
by use of a tool will result in the same or higher 
quality output as if the process had been performed 
manually. 
3.3. Approval credit 
3.3.1. Aeronautics 
In civil and military aviation, independent authorities 
like Federal Aviation Administration or European 
Aviation Safety Agency are in charge of certification 
of aircraft and their embedded systems regarding 
safety. 
Certification typically applies to aircraft or engine 
types. The certification authority considers the 
software as part of the airborne system or equipment 
installed in the certified aircraft or engine; that is, the 
certification authority does not approve the software 
as a unique, stand-alone product. Currently, 
computer hardware and software must be approved 
as a "system" for every installation. 
3.3.2. Space 
The standards applicable to the space sector in 
Europe correspond to the series of standards 
elaborated by the ECSS, European Cooperation for 
Space Standardisation, a cooperative effort of the 
European Space Agency, national space agencies 
and European industry associations for the purpose 
of developing and maintaining common standards. 
In terms of regulation, it is worth noting that the 
application of the ECSS standards is not enforced by 
law, but proposed to be, and generally is, adopted, 
possibly with adaptations, by contract on a case by 
case basis. 
This does not mean that the space sector is not 
subject to certification in a stricter meaning. In 
particular most countries, as they are responsible for 
all launches on their territory, have set up legal rules 
associated to launchers, spacecraft, launch 
installations and procedures, and the corresponding 
licensing scheme. For instance launches from the 
“Centre Spatial Guyanais” in Kourou are submitted 
by delegation to the authority of the French National 
Space Agency CNES. 
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3.3.3. Automotive 
In the automotive domain, the ISO/DIS 26262 
provides a set of requirements, so called 
confirmation measures, to ensure that an 
assessment of safety is properly done on EE 
aspects. 
The actors performing the confirmation measures 
shall have a minimum level of independence from 
the people in charge of development and release for 
production. The higher the ASIL the higher the 
independence required. It is to be noted that the 
highest level of independence required may be 
reached within the same company. 
The confirmation measures consist in: 
• safety reviews to verify key deliverables, 
• a safety audit to verify the appropriateness of the 
process, 
• a safety assessment to evaluate the whole safety 
case. 
3.3.4. Railway 
The major standards are the European Railway 
Standards required by law: 
• CENELEC EN 50126 establishes a method for 
the specification and demonstration of reliability, 
availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS), for 
railway domain. 
• CENELEC EN 50129 provides general guidance 
to demonstrate the safety of electronic systems 
and to construct the safety case for signalling 
railway application. 
• CENELEC EN 50128 provides requirements for 
the software used in signalling railway 
application. 
• For safety related communication, CENELEC EN 
50159-1 is dedicated to closed transmission 
systems and CENELEC EN 50159-2 is dedicated 
to open transmission systems. 
In general, the safety related series of CENELEC 
5012x standards was derived from IEC 61508. 
The benefits from using this standard were 
mentioned as they are the “code of practice” for 
railroad industries in the European Union and a 
prerequisite for the approval of safety relevant 
applications in the railroad context. Furthermore, 
CENELEC standards are international standards that 
facilitate market access. 
Certification and qualification are given by conformity 
to the specific standard and/or meeting the 
regulatory requirements. Some may require third 
party certification while others allow self assessment. 
In general, national regulation and law have a strong 
impact on the system and its required safety. Up to 
now, they differ much in different European 
countries. This makes certification and approval on a 
cross-country basis very difficult and expensive. But 
with the new European view for opening the market, 
new practices are put in place: standards that define 
what is a railway system, what is a subway system, 
what is an interoperable system, etc. 
For the railway domain, all European countries (see 
the directive 2004/49/CE) must have a Safety 
Authority to control its use and protect the people 
and the environment from the harmful effects of 
railway accident. In case of ERTMS1 (European Rail 
Traffic Management System) components the 
certification is mandatory. For ERTMS certification, 
each nation recognizes a “notified body”. In France 
the notified body is “CERTIFER2” for interoperability 
of the Trans-European rail system directives: 
96/48/CE for high speed transportation, 2001/16/CE 
for conventional speed. 
ERA is the European Railways Authority, and in 
France the Railway Safety Authority is 
“Etablissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire” 
(EPSF3). 
According to the new European commercial plans 
and laws, railway systems are designed to be 
operated in more than one country. Since 2007, 
cross-acceptance has been coming out, which 
should ease such certification activities. Basically it 
means that for instance, a train certified or approved 
in one country, will get approval in other countries as 
well. In contradiction to the cross-acceptance, the 
different national regulations can impose additional 
requirements. 
3.3.5. Automation 
The standard IEC 61508 does not provide provisions 
for any type of certification. 
The European Machinery Directive requests a type 
certification associated with the CE label. This is 
achieved by the manufacturer through an auto-
certification process. 
3.3.6. Nuclear 
All countries using nuclear energy have set up a 
Safety Authority to control its use and protect the 
people and the environment from the harmful effects 
of radiations. In France the Safety Authority is 
“Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire” (ASN). Its technical 
support is “Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté 
Nucléaire” (IRSN). 
The nuclear power plants are not submitted to 
“certification”, but to authorization for creation and 
operation. This authorization is formally delivered by 
a decree of the government following a proposal of 
ASN. 
                                                     
1
 http://www.ertms.com/  
2
 http://www.certifer.fr  
3
 http://www.securite-ferroviaire.fr  
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The only documents having full regulatory status are 
the “arrêtés” (orders) issued by the government. 
They provide high level requirements and do not 
enter into technical details. In practice, regarding the 
computer-based safety systems, the documents 
issued by IAEA for the general approach and by 
TC45 of IEC for the development are proposed by 
the utility and considered as acceptable means by 
IRSN and ASN. 
4. Technical comparison highlights 
The review of similarities and dissimilarities on the 
technical content, interpretation and utilisation of the 
standards is highlighted in this section through a 
selection of important topics: the orientation of 
standards towards integrated or external safety, 
towards the prescription of objectives vs. means, 
their notions of severity, criticality and assurance 
levels, their focus on fault tolerance or fault 
prevention, on probabilistic vs. deterministic safety 
assessment methods, and the notion of safety case. 
4.1. Integrated safety or external safety systems 
Depending on applications and sectors, safety is 
ensured by means of different architectures. Plant 
(classical or nuclear), machine automation and 
railway promote specialised safety systems: the 
safety is monitored and guaranteed by a specific 
system, distinct from the system implemented the 
required function. Automotive and aeronautics 
promote safe systems: the safety is “integrated” in 
the functional system. These possibilities are 
determined in practice by the structure of the risks 
versus the protective systems. For instance when no 
specific safe state exist, a separated protection 
system will be useless as there will be no possibility 
of driving the controlled equipment to a safe state 
upon failure of the protection system. It becomes 
then necessary to focus on a safe control system, 
rather than on a dedicated independent protection 
system. The intrinsic characteristics of the industrial 
sectors are then the design drivers to choose how to 
integrate or segregate the safety management part. 
In the automotive industry, the key design driver is 
hardware cost. Therefore, a dedicated independent 
protection system is never considered. In most 
applications the control system provides built-in 
mechanisms to detect failures and put the system in 
a safe state. However, in some cases, external 
safety is considered when it is possible to use an 
existing feature of another system as a protection 
mechanism. 
4.2. Objectives vs. Means prescription 
The authors of safety standards have to choose 
between being prescriptive on the means to satisfy 
high-level safety objectives, or prescriptive on the 
objectives, considering that the means are 
completely under the applicant's responsibility. 
A means-prescriptive standard is easy to use when 
applied strictly in the conditions envisioned by its 
authors. However it does not address easily the 
emergence of new technology, methods and tools. 
An objectives-prescriptive standard can apply to a 
large variety of technologies, life cycles, tools, etc. 
but needs to be interpreted before being used; and 
the interpretation may be questionable and could 
seriously differ from the intent of the standard’s 
authors. 
The different standards reflect a large variety of 
positions, between these two extremes (means- or 
objectives-prescriptive), for example: 
• IEC 61508 is definitely means-prescriptive as it 
“recommends”, “highly recommends” or even 
“mandate” specific means to achieve safety 
objectives. 
• ED-12/DO-178 is widely recognized as an 
objectives-prescriptive standard  
4.3. Categorising severity and assurance levels 
In all investigated domains, the standards introduce 
a categorisation into “levels” which may be called 
safety integrity levels, criticality categories etc., The 
idea is to associate to a system (or function, 
component etc.) an attribute characterising the worst 
case consequences (severity) of its potential failures, 
possibly combined, for some domains (e.g., 
automotive), with the notion of exposure frequency. 
In a classical risk assessment based approach this 
sets a limit on the likelihood of failure occurrence so 
that the risk remains acceptable. 
Criticality categories are in general allocated to 
functions. This defines (a part of) the requirements 
applicable to the development (and validation) of the 
elements implementing them (systems, hardware, 
software items) so as to address the possible 
sources of failures appropriately with respect to the 
categories,: 
• Random hardware faults: standards define the 
target maximum probability of failure and/or a 
maximum number of independent faults leading 
to a failure, for each category. 
• Development faults, affecting system, hardware 
or software design: standards define the 
requirements applicable to all the development 
and validation processes needed to elaborate 
these items, especially development and 
validation processes. Requirements vary 
according to the “criticality” (or equivalent) levels, 
defining different DAL (Development Assurance 
levels). The idea is that, as discussed in §4.5, 
there is no attempt to evaluate numerically the 
probability of failure due to such faults, but to 
consider that fulfilling these requirements 
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provides a level of confidence compatible with the 
severity of the risk. 
There are significant variations between standards 
on how the severity of consequences is defined and 
ranked and how criticality categories are allocated 
(e.g., on whether and how it is possible to realise a 
function at some level with elements at some other 
(lower) level, using such or such redundancy 
scheme). However all standards agree on the basic 
principles and on the necessity to enforce a strong 
isolation against fault propagation between elements 
at different categories. 
There are also differences in the requirements 
associated to each category and even on their 
nature. For example ED12B/DO178B states process 
objectives whereas IEC 61508 or EN 50128 list 
explicitly some recommended techniques. ISO/DIS 
26262 and ECSS are somewhat hybrid with some 
requirements on objectives supplemented by some 
suggested means. 
In the current situation, it is very difficult and 
expensive for software or tool providers to address 
several domains because of the necessity to comply 
with the union of the requirements of each domain. 
Conversely there is little evidence that the 
specificities of each domain are sufficient to justify all 
the observed differences. 
4.4. Fault tolerance or fault prevention 
Basically, in the domains covered by the paper, the 
fault tolerance is required at the system level, not at 
the software level: the software standards addressed 
in this paper basically target the achievement of 
fault-free software, either explicitly stated (EC 60880 
or CENELEC EN 50128) or not (DO178, etc.) 
This is achieved through requirements on both the 
processes (e.g. clear and extensive documentation, 
adherence to specification, design, code standards) 
and the product (e.g. verification, restriction to 
unambiguous constructs, mastering of parallelism, 
behaviour completely determined by the functional 
inputs). 
Self-supervision usually required by software 
standards such as IEC 60880 is mainly oriented to 
the detection of random hardware failures such as 
corruption of memory content or transmission errors. 
In case of detected failure, the standards do not 
require the continuation of the normal processing but 
require that a predefined action be taken (e.g. 
outputs set to a safe position when applicable).  
The tolerance of software to its own errors is not 
required, because this could need detection and 
reconfiguration algorithms more complex than the 
functional software itself, and could therefore 
significantly increase the potential for errors. To 
avoid this, standards such as IEC 60880 require that 
self-supervision does not adversely affect the 
intended functions. In the railway sector, the 
CENELEC EN 50128 (table A.3) states that the 
backward and forward recovery, the dynamic 
reconfiguration and/or fault correction of software are 
not recommended. 
The tolerance to hypothetical software errors is 
implemented at system level or at top-level 
architecture by means based on functional diversity. 
For example a secondary computer within the 
system may monitor the main one and check the 
plausibility of its outputs with a different algorithm, or 
two different systems may independently trigger a 
given safety action, based on different algorithms 
involving different physical measurements. The 
choice between such architectural solutions mainly 
depends on the characteristics of the underlying 
controlled process. 
4.5. Probabilistic versus deterministic 
It is remarkable that the approach to quantification of 
system failure risks is identical in the aeronautic, 
automation, automotive, nuclear, railway and space 
dependability standards. In particular, none of them 
gives credit to probabilistic assessment of software 
failure.  
The standards in the 6 domains considered in this 
paper uniformly regard software as a deterministic 
artefact whose functional failures, contrary to 
hardware, can only be caused by residual 
specification, design or implementation faults. 
Therefore, software safety building, assessment and 
measure is uniformly handled through design 
assurance, a design assurance policy being 
enforced through a standard- dependent mix of 
process-based and product-based development 
activities.  
The stringency of the development fault avoidance 
policy is graded into a few discrete levels, 3 to 5 
depending on the standards that determine different 
sets of quality and development activities objectives. 
But there is no quantified likelihood of residual fault 
or functional failure associated to these levels. 
The effects of the residual software faults that may 
lead to systematic software-induced system failures 
are handled through fault tolerance mechanisms, 
which still lie in the deterministic arena, be they 
implemented in software or hardware. 
Probabilistic assessment comes into play to quantify 
the likelihood of component-level hardware failures 
on the one hand, and the likelihood of system-level 
user-oriented dreaded events on the other hand. All 
the standards set probability-based rareness 
objectives to the system level feared events, 
depending on their respective severity. 
Almost no standard recommends probabilistic safety 
assessment methods to propagate the probabilities 
from hardware level up to system level.  
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Following a simple divide and conquer approach, 
which by the way is the only tractable one in 
practice, the probabilistic assessment methods of 
the density of the system level dreaded behaviours 
that are explicitly or implicitly recommended by the 
standards do not rely on system level behavioural 
analysis. They rely on architectural modelling, 
possibly including time-dependent fault-tolerance 
reconfiguration logics, by means of reliability 
diagrams, fault trees or state machines that capture 
the event-to-functions and the function-to-resources 
dependencies. 
In particular, the Boolean models (possibly 
sequential) that support the probabilistic computation 
get rid of any analysis of the complex behavioural 
propagation of the quantified failures from hardware 
level up to user level through the networked software 
and hardware machinery. Depending on the 
dependability engineer's expertise in modelling, this 
behavioural abstraction is done in a conservative 
way regarding probabilistic estimation.  
So in all standards, a state of the art pragmatic and 
hopefully sound separation of concerns is admitted: 
deterministic analysis of local behaviours (hardware 
or software) ruled by design assurance policies on 
one side, probabilistic analysis of events through 
global function-organ dependency graphs, ruled by 
severity-based rareness objectives on the other side. 
As stated by the IAEA, “it is not possible to derive a 
failure rate for a software based system on an 
objective and fully defendable basis. The reliability 
assigned to the system is ultimately a matter of 
judgement” [IAEA 1135]. 
Thus the software standards concentrate on 
deterministic verification, for example through tests 
selected to cover all functionalities and further 
verification of the adequate structural coverage 
achieved by these tests. For safety critical software 
(e.g. in the nuclear or aeronautic sector), these tests 
are built by people independent from the 
development team. 
In order to provide inputs to the probabilistic 
requirements assigned to systems embedding 
software, it is agreed within most sectors that the 
development of software in compliance with the 
sector’s specific standards makes it possible to meet 
the safety requirements, assigned as probabilistic 
targets to the system (such as 10-4 failure per 
demand or 10-9 failure per hour), while considering 
software as deterministic. 
4.6. Safety case 
We define a safety case as: a documented body of 
evidence that provides a convincing and valid 
argument that a system is adequately safe for a 
given application in a given environment. Its purpose 
is to participate to the demonstration that a product 
is safe. It is a keystone in certification. It is generally 
produced incrementally during the life cycle, and can 
be delivered at milestones such as before 
progressing to detailed development and before 
installation and commissioning. 
A safety case is a reasoned and supported 
argument, a way of documenting and providing 
assurance to the stakeholders that a system is 
acceptably safe thanks to compliance with a 
particular safety standard. It must be updated during 
all the life of the product and must be available even 
after stop of production (number of years will depend 
on the domain). 
A safety case is a requirement in some safety 
standards for example that of the railway domain 
(CENELEC EN 50129) and the automotive domain 
(ISO/DIS 26262). CENELEC EN 50129 even defines 
the content of the safety case.  
Depending on the industrial domain or country, its 
constitution may differ. It can be as simple as a 
collection of information produced during the 
development or a thorough and coherent stand 
alone argumentation substantiated by evidence 
collected during the complete safety lifecycle. In 
aeronautics, nuclear or space we can consider that 
even if not mentioned as such, the safety case 
results from the documents and assurance provided 
as the result of the conformance to the safety 
standards of the sector. 
The safety case is one subject of further analysis 
within the CG2E working group. 
5. Conclusion, perspectives 
5.1. Conclusion 
This paper presented major relevant topics regarding 
the comparison of the safety standards of six 
industrial domains, and identified some important 
principles that may now be considered for 
harmonization purposes. We also observed that 
some topics remain domain-specific.  
We identified the possibility to group the domains 
into a small number of categories. However this 
grouping may vary according to the considered topic. 
For instance, all the covered domains agree upon 
the articulation of a deterministic view of software 
and the system safety goals, including the 
probabilistic ones. Conversely, the regulation regime 
and certification scheme is similar for aviation, 
nuclear and, to some extent, railway and space, but 
significantly different for automation and automotive. 
Aviation, space and nuclear are very close domains, 
sharing many concerns, needs and solutions in 
terms of processes, methods and techniques. These 
fields have developed since the 80’s software 
standards reflecting their safety approach, i.e. 
requiring a strong, deterministic demonstration of 
design correctness. These standards do not promote 
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or require the use of specific tools, methods or 
languages because this would require taking into 
account all possible applications, company practices, 
people skills and future technology evolutions, which 
is not realistic. For these reasons, using the generic 
standard IEC 61508 in its current approach is not 
possible in these fields. 
Automation and railway are difficult to compare on a 
global perspective because automation is a very 
large domain covering different systems and 
practices. The standards applicable to automation, 
automotive and rail are different but are indeed 
principally derived from the generic standard IEC 
61508. Note however that another difference comes 
from the fact that most products for rail applications 
are at the highest criticality level (SIL 4), while it is 
much more variable for automation products. 
The clear identification of these similarities, 
dissimilarities and trends could provide important 
sources of improvement (especially for safety 
analysis, process efficiency and cost) mainly for tool 
and COTS providers. Tracks for possible 
harmonization have been exhibited for each of the 
industrial domains, in full compatibility with its own 
standards. 
In addition to some terminology discrepancies, the 
main identified limits to harmonization, are: 
• the way to allocate the development assurance 
levels to system, software and hardware with 
respect to the safety requirements (we have 
shown some common approaches can be 
envisioned), 
• the regulation regime and certification scheme for 
critical embedded systems software, 
• the standards elaboration bodies, which are 
specific for each domain, with little or no interest 
for cross-domains standardizations. 
5.2. Perspectives 
The existence of common high-level goals in the 
different sectors shows the need and the possibility 
for harmonization and alignment of the standards 
analyzed in this paper. A preferred way would be to 
refer to a generic safety standard which would 
establish these high level goals, and then would be 
implemented in detail in sector-specific ones. 
No existing standard could be a candidate for such a 
generic role. Therefore we intend in a future work to 
define the set of common high level safety objectives 
and rationale underlying the justification scheme. 
Even if some standardization bodies are willing to 
operate such a convergence, as we see for example 
in the nuclear field the endorsement of IEC/45A 
standards by CENELEC and the development of 
“dual-logo” standards by IEC/45A and IEEE, it is still 
not a generalized attitude. Our working group, 
composed of some of the major contributors to the 
various standards, and the work we want to 
complete could influence this, showing that it is 
possible and worthwhile. 
We aim at complementing the studies that we have 
initiated, by sharing as many common sub-
processes as possible between various domains, 
which in fact have similar issues when developing 
complex embedded systems. 
For example, we are working on consolidation and 
harmonization of C-coding rules, with also important 
consequences on the possible rationalisation of 
associated support tools. This work, which will be 
presented at “Assises Franco-Allemandes de 
l’Embarqué”, in October 2010 is a first concrete 
example of benefits expected from such an initiative. 
A probable extension of our work will be pushed 
forward in 2011 at a European level, for instance 
within the ARTEMIS Joint Undertaking or the 7th 
Framework Programme of the European 
Commission (e.g., ProSE). 
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8. Glossary 
AFNOR Agence Française de Normalisation 
ARP Aerospace Recommended Practice 
ARTEMIS Advanced Research and Technology for 
Embedded Intelligence and Systems 
ASIL Automotive Safety Integrity Level 
ASN Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire 
CDV Committee Draft for Vote 
CE Conformité Européenne 
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardisation 
CG2E Club des Grandes Entreprises de l’Embarqué 
CNES Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (French 
National Space Agency) 
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf (component) 
COPUOS Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
DIS Draft International Standard 
E/E (/PE) Electrical/Electronic (/Programmable Electronic) 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
ECSS European Cooperation for Space 
Standardisation 
EPSF Etablissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire 
ERA European Railways Agency 
ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System 
ESA European Space Agency 
EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation 
Equipment 
FAA Federal Aviation Authority 
I&C Instrumentation and Control 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization   
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation 
NWI New Work Item 
PES Programmable Electronic Systems 
ProSE Promoting Standardisation for Embedded 
systems 
PSS Procedures, Specifications and Standards 
RTCA Radio Technical Committee for Aeronautics 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
STRM-TG  Service technique des Remontées 
Mécaniques – Transports Guidés 
